The Pursuit Of Happiness

For Sigmund Freud, is it possible to be happy? Why?

            Being happy in itself involves one of the two concepts that a person seeks to be happy, or alternatively seeks to avoid unhappiness. Sigmund Freud, in his work Civilization And Its Discontents, understands humans “are foredoomed to discover that moments of happiness and contentedness are few, transient, and infrequent. The same cannot be said of the experience of the opposite.”(Sigmund Freud, 15) Freud does not believe true happiness exists with the oppression of civilization to control our “primitive impulses”(17) as sexual beings.

            Throughout his work, Freud argues that people use false measurements of their standards for happiness: that they seek things such as power, wealth and success and underestimate what is of true value in life. Happiness can be not derived by simplistic approaches, but rather elaborate false sense of accomplishments either from nature, external or internal sources. This resonates in Freud’s hypothesis that

“we can derive intense enjoyment only from a contrast and very little from a state of things. Unhappiness is much less difficult to experience. We are treated with suffering from three directions: from our own body, which is doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without pain and anxiety as warning signals; from the external world which may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction; and finally from our relations to other men.”(43-44)

While the first two are easier to manipulate through medicine and proper safety precautions from the external pulls, the latter is perhaps the most enduring than the others. Through these potential dangers, a person’s approach to achieving happiness is altered – “the pleasure principle itself, indeed, under the influence of the external world, changed into the more modest reality principle”(44) – than one’s goal of achieving happiness only from the fact that they have escaped unhappiness gives less prominence to pleasure itself.

            Freud argues that misplaced libido in order to seek pleasure fulfills our need for happiness, which cannot be truly fulfilled but can only be brought nearer to fulfillment through a positive approach, that of gaining happiness, or the negative approach, that of avoiding unhappiness. However, I believe that the definition of happiness is essentially different from one person to the next, and whether they achieve happiness is dependent on one’s own expectations of it and what they demand to fulfill those needs. And from this we can infer “that the abolition or reduction of those demands would result in a return to possibilities of happiness.”(59) For example, children in developing nations today are content with absolute essential needs such as clean water and a proper education, and accordingly this is how their definition of happiness is formed. In contrast, children growing up in Hollywood have a different outlook on what is considered a necessity as opposed to something they want. What some could say as "spoiled", children from a higher socio-economic background have their interpretation of happiness entrenched in foreign cars and the newest style on the fashion runway. In regards to happiness, one's definition will change immensely relative to personal aspirations, rather than a universally applied theme.

Socrates' Controversial Charge & Trial

1. Do you think these charges are legitimate? Is this a fair trial?

In F.J Church’s translation of “Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito”, the legitimacy of the charges against Socrates and the ensuing trial are debatable, thusly so for a lack of concrete reasoning behind the charges and the exact parameters of the trial procedure. While it is true that what was expected in Athens at the time of the trial is vastly distorted from present society standards, I explore this issue from my interpretations of the dialogue parallel to present standards.

Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon collectively accused Socrates of impiety, which loosely translated in him “corrupting the youth, and of believing not in the gods whom the state believes in, but in other new divinities” (F.J Church, 29). This is tainted by the fact that Meletus et al. are scorned over Socrates cross-examination and wittingly undermining their intelligence. This is resonated in Socrates speech, in which he addresses to the jury and judges,

“But be assured it is certainly true, as I have already told you, that I have aroused much indignation. This is what will cause my condemnation if I am condemned; not Meletus nor Anytus either, but that prejudice and resentment of the multitude which have been destruction of many good men before me, and I think will be so again” (34).

Furthermore, Socrates traps Meletus in a contradictory statement in which Socrates argues that if he in fact believes in divine things, than in turn he should also believe in divinities which directly correlates to divine things, ironically defined by Meletus himself. This ironic and contradictory fashion is also portrayed in Socrates argument that if he had not questioned the wisdom of the wisest of men, that he would be directly disobeying the oracle, thus disobeying the direct order of the divinities themselves, resulting in the same predicament: so who is to decide which instance will be given more weight than the other. Socrates further goes on to argue that Meletus et al. did not state he has ever demanded or received any payment for his teachings, which to they have no witness, and he, in turn, has sufficient witness to the truth of what he says: his poverty and utter devotion to god in which he carries out his life. Socrates articulates that he was, and still is willing to engage in conversation despite one’s social stature and financial state, and did not ask for followers but merely attained them through practices of piety.  In addition, Socrates refutes that if he had indeed corrupted the youth in his past, they would take revenge upon him by now, and if not, their family and elders would have avenged this injustice indefinitely. He then directs this into the audience in which he exemplifies this notion, that in reality they “will find all these men ready to support me, the corrupter who has injured their relatives”(41). For these reasons, I believe that the charges against Socrates are illegitimate and in most cases exhibit prejudice, highlighting the indignation of Meletus, Anytus and Lycon.

            In respect to the trial itself, I believe that it also was flawed. Taking in account that our current system of justice focuses on “innocent until proven guilty", Socrates in contrast had to prove his innocence by cross-examining the facts himself. This seemed apparently futile to me, for Socrates was essentially accused of impiety – a vague concept that was illustrated by Socrates and Euthyphro’s episode – which the jury exploited to mask their indignation: ultimately leading to Socrates' demise.